Abstract. More and more countries are beginning to use electronic certificates, which store fingerprints, irises and other private data, and require a reliable authorization control mechanism to ensure the security of personal information. The extended access control (EAC) mechanism published by ICAO is efficient and secure, but the process is complex and difficult to grasp. In order to popularize EAC, the work flow is deeply analyzed, and the key and difficult points of EAC are elaborated in detail, which reduces the difficulty of application and is beneficial to the large-scale popularization.
Introduction
The standard of electronic certificates originated from the Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) project promoted by ICAO. The electronic document implemented by contactless smart card technology is the most advanced way of machine reading certificate. It can not only effectively solve the problem of document forgery, but also greatly improve the efficiency of the legitimate holder's clearance. Access to personal sensitive privacy data such as fingerprints on electronic documents requires more secure authorization control. ICAO recommends the optional use of the European Commission to develop an extended access control mechanism.
EAC
In December 31, 2004, the European Commission's regulation No. 2252/2004 stipulated the safety characteristics and biometrics standards of electronic documents and travel documents. The European Union promulgated the regulations for the implementation of electronic certificates for all its member states. The date of August 2006 is the latest date. These electronic documents require that the digital photos of the document holder and other information, such as name, date of birth and nationality, be stored in a chip on the travel document. These electronic data are protected by the Basic Access Control (BAC) security protocol, and the data integrity is guaranteed by Passive Authentication (PA) [1] .
In June 2006, the European Commission issued new regulations, adding two fingerprints to the EU Member States as additional biometrics information, which is required to be implemented at the latest in June 2009. Germany moved in November 2008, the first country in Europe to move to a new system. In September 2008, European Union members held an EAC1.11 version of the interoperability test in Prague, Czech. And the German BSI organization has issued the EAC2.0 specification. In the field of EAC research, Europe is already in the forefront of the world. Singapore has also proposed its own extended access control specification.
The usual document reading and writing process is shown in Figure 1 . EAC access control is divided into two parts: the chip authentication (CA) and the terminal authentication (TA), which can be used as an independent chip authentication CA protocol instead of the active authentication (AA), and TA can only use a combination of chip and authentication, TA authentication is terminal equipment authorized to read document holder privacy data (fingerprint and iris). CA eliminates the challenge response mechanism, but uses the key exchange protocol (such as DH and ECDH) to carry out the key exchange between the machine terminal and the certificate, and prevents the clone according to the matching between the EF.DG14 (including the public key) and the private key protected by the certificate issued by the state. The new key seed of the protocol is carried out through the key exchange, and the BAC mode is read [2] . In September 2008 the EU members in Prague Austria held an EAC1.11 version of the interoperability testing algorithm in statistics show that: the combination1 of selected sample documents, accounting for 10/34, the combination2 accounted for 2/34, select the combination3 accounted for 0/34, select the combination4 accounted for 22/34. This paper analyzes the EAC process and security mechanism by combining the optimal algorithm with ECDH+ECDSA [3] .
Authentication Process

CA Process
AA is a malicious clone to prevent electronic data, which is carried out in a challenging response. The machine terminal sends a challenge value (random number or a meaningful string) to the certificate. The document uses the AA private key to sign the signature and send it back to the terminal. The terminal is verified with the AA public key of the document. But there is a flaw in this mechanism, if the challenge sent by the machine terminal is of special significance. For example: (1) This challenge is sent to the document at this time, and the document is signed back after the signature is signed. All agencies with machine terminal public key can confirm that the license holder has appeared at a certain time at a certain time according to the challenge value of signature and machine signature, and the whereabouts privacy of the holder is exposed. CA mainly completes the authentication of the authenticity of cards, mainly based on the principle of pairwise matching between public and private keys in the public key mechanism. Instead of using the challenge response, the key -exchange protocol is used to verify the matching of the implicit key pairs. By reading the file DG14 that has the exchange algorithm and the card public key, the device terminal generates the public private key pair of the same algorithm by itself.
Here is a specific example to describe the CA process: 
TA Process
The TA process mainly completes the authorized authentication of the terminal. This process is mainly the verification process of three certificates (CVCA National Certificate, DVCA certificate issuing certificate, IS terminal certificate). The three certificates are divided into three grades: the IS terminal certificate is signed by the DVCA, and the DVCA certificate is signed by the CVCA certificate [4] . The DVCA certificate is sent to the issuing country by diplomatic means to sign the CVCA. The certificate validation process is based on the validation process of the ECDSA algorithm, and the specific validation process is shown in Figure 3 .
If the border inspection customs need to read the privacy issues such as the fingerprint or the iris of the bearer, it must be certified by TA.
EAC Security Mechanism Key Exchange
Key exchange algorithm will be introduced in the CA process. Before the terminal A will send a message to the certificate B, the two negotiate a set of six-parameter elliptic curve parameters. A and B need to do the following: For Q＝k A k B G＝k B k A G, so the session key Q is shared by tool terminal A and certificate B. Just like the file structure shown in Figure 4 , EF.DG14 stores the parameters of the elliptic curve. The header part of the file indicates the key exchange algorithm and the OID followed by the elliptic curve parameters p, a, b, G, n and the public key Q. 
Signing and Certification
The ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature algorithm is needed during the TA process. The form of the elliptic curve parameter is defined as a six-element couple, in the ECC working draft formulated by the SEC. Generally noted as: R＝ (q,A,B,G,n,h ). In the above:
 The integer q represents the number of domain elements in the base field F(pm) of the elliptic curve;  A,B respectively represent the coefficients of the elliptic curve equation;  G is a base point of the elliptic curve point group;  n is the order of the base point G of the elliptic curve;  h is the remaining factor, the base point G can be found quickly using h. ECDSA has no message recovery feature signature scheme [5] .The parameters that need to be used include: elliptic curve parameter six-point couple; pending messagem; a pair of public and private key pairs d and Q,Q＝dG, where d is the private key and Q is the public key.
The signing process is as follows:  Select integer k(1<k<n-2)，computing (x T ,y T )=kG, and setting r = x T mod n;  Compute s=k -1 (m+ dr) mod n by using the private key of machine terminal A;
 Terminal A sends m and signature(r, s) to the certificate B. After certificate B receives the signature (r, s) of tool terminal A, it uses the public key Q and system parameters of A. The verification process is as follows:  Computing w＝s -1 mod n;  Computing u 1 = mw mod n u2 = rw mod n;  Computing (x D , y D )= u 1 G+ u 2 Q，when x D mod n＝r，certificate B will accept terminal A's signature on message m. The elliptic curve cryptosystem has the same security as existing public key cryptosystems, but the key length is relatively short. Shorter keys mean less computational and memory requirements, and different application environments require different elliptic ciphers protocol [6] .
Certificate
The development of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is closely related to the development of key theory. In the EAC mechanism, the terminal authentication process mainly relies on the PKI to complete the authorization authentication process for the terminal. When the certificate is issued, it is necessary to use the Country Signing Certificate Authority (CSCA) to issue the certificate of the signer. This certificate can be used to sign the hash of each DGx [7] . In order to authentication during passive authentication, place the certificate issuer certificate and signature value together in the EF.SOD file. The process is shown in figure 5 . The issuing country of the certificate and the country where the Customs border is inspected must use the Country Verification Certificate Authority (CVCA) to issue a certificate to the Document Verifier Certificate Authority (DVCA) through diplomatic channels. DVCA issues certificates to the Inspection System (IS). Certificates are verified from top to bottom according to level [8] . The process is shown in Figure 6 . First, the EAC mechanism executes the BAC protocol and checks the chip and verifies the authenticity of the system by running the latest version of PKI on an asymmetric key pair. Secondly, for the inspection, the systems of the border control regions in various countries require the certificate documents of the issuing country as the prerequisite for obtaining the fingerprint access stored on the chip. EAC also supports the most secure data encoding by establishing a powerful session key during data transmission [9] .
Conclusion
This article describes in detail the EU's electronic document extension access control security mechanism process. The purpose of this article is to learn and use its design concepts and design techniques. Therefore, it can better help research personnel to design a security protocol that protects personal privacy data of the certificate in accordance with their national conditions.
